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Ill THE SUPREME COURT 
i)F THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN' THRIFT STORES 
INC., et al.i 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants; 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et aL, 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Supreme Court 
No. 910471 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter on appeal under the 
provisions of Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, 1953 as amended; and Rule 
3 , Utah Rules of Appe 1 la I; e Pr ocedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court 
upon the basis that defendants are immune from suit under the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Set;, 6'3--30" I 0 ( 1)? 
2. Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court 
upon the basis that defendants are immune from suit under the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Set , ft.j-jo- i u (4 ) / 
3. Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court 
i - a matter oi idw, plaintiffs failed to raise 
any genuine issues i. fact requiring trial? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court considers the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, Citv Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 
1991), resolving all doubt in his favor, Briaham Truck & Implement 
v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1987). Because summary judgment 
presents for review only questions of law, this Court reviews the 
issues for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. 
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp. . 836 P.2d 797 (Utah 1992). However, 
an appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. Citv Consumer Services, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Sections 63-30-10(1) and (4), Utah Code 1953 as amended (as in 
effect in 1983) : 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
Rule 56(c) and (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) The motion (for summary judgment) shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
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be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of 
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
Ru] e 4 5 01 (2) 111" a h C o d o o t J u d i c *: i >a I Ad in i n i s t r a t i o n i 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of Motion. The 
points and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which movant 
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains 
a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set 
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forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is based upon the complaint of Plaintiffs, Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores, et al. (RockyMtn), alleging negligence on 
the part of Defendants, Salt Lake City Corporation, State of Utah, 
Salt Lake County, et al. (Defts), in Defendants' efforts to control 
flood waters coursing down City Creek during the spring runoff 
floods of 1983. In their complaint, filed September 15, 1983, 
RockyMtn prayed for injunctive relief in their first cause of 
action. Said prayer soon became moot and no further proceedings 
were had in regard thereto. In their second cause of action, 
RockyMtn claimed (1) an unconstitutional taking of their private 
property for public purposes, without just compensation; (2) 
negligence by Defts in the design and maintenance of the City Creek 
conduit underlying North Temple Street in Salt Lake City which was 
the proximate cause of damage to RockyMtn; and (3) negligence by 
Defts in several instances during efforts to control the 1983 
spring runoff flood within City Creek which was the proximate cause 
of damage to RockyMtn. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Following a period of discovery, RockyMtn's complaint was 
dismissed by Judge Philip R. Fishier on February 11, 1985, pursuant 
to motions for dismissal and/or summary judgment filed by each of 
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the defendants. An appeal of that dismissal was subsequently taken 
by RockyMtn to this Court. That appeal was heard as Case No. 
20513, and the Court's decision was delivered on December 14, 1989. 
It is reported as Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores. Inc., et al. v. 
Salt Lake Citv Corporation, et ah. 784 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989) . 
This Court upheld the trial court in ruling that RockyMtn had no 
cause of action for the taking of private property for public use 
without just compensation. It further held that Defts were immune 
from RockyMtn's allegations of negligence in the design and 
construction of the culvert for City Creek which underlay North 
Temple Street, because the decisions inherent in such design and 
construction were discretionary functions. This Court remanded the 
case to the District Court for development of additional evidence 
concerning RockyMtn's allegations of negligence in the inspection 
and maintenance of the culvert and in Defts' operations during 
their attempts to control the City Creek flood. 
Following remand, the parties engaged in further discovery. 
Additional depositions were taken, i.e.. those of Dale Edward 
Anderson, Merrill Norman, and Clark Lin. RockyMtn thereupon 
certified their readiness for trial. Thereafter, each defendant 
made motions for summary judgment. Said motions were supported by 
memoranda and supporting affidavits, as required by Rule 4-
501(2)(a), Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In his "Summary Decision and Order" 
filed September 4, 1991, Judge Michael R. Murphy granted Defts' 
motions for summary judgment, and on October 1, 1991, Judge Murphy 
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entered summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
County. This present appeal is taken from Judge Murphy's grant of 
summary judgment. 
(The State of Utah and its individually named defendants were 
granted summary judgment earlier upon separate grounds. The issues 
related to that action of the District Court are addressed by those 
defendants.) 
C. Statement of Uncontested Facts. 
In order to avoid repetition in presentation of briefs, Salt 
Lake County adopts the statement of facts presented by Salt Lake 
City, with the following additions. This is done with the 
knowledge and consent of counsel for Salt Lake City. 
1. With respect to paragraph 3 of City's Statement, Section 
17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, was enacted in 1947 to 
authorize counties to provide for the carrying away and safe 
disposal of natural storm and flood waters by utilization and 
regulation of the natural channels within the counties. (Judicial 
notice of statute and annotations.) 
2. Additionally, with respect to paragraph 3 of City's 
Statement, Salt Lake County adopted its ordinance for flood control 
under the authority of said Sec. 17-8-5 in 1982, and published it 
as Ordinance 7-2-1, et seq., Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County. Said ordinance is now codified as Section 17.08.010, et 
seq. , Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances. (Judicial notice of 
provisions of ordinance and date of adoption.) 
3. Salt Lake City is a Utah municipal corporation with the 
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requisite police power to provide for the health, safety and 
welfare of its citizens, and for the building and repairing of 
culverts, drains, and facilities necessary to proper drainage. 
(Sees. 10-8-38, 10-8-84, Utah Code, 1953 as amended.) 
4. With respect to paragraph 6 of City's statement, the 
known historic peak flow of water through the City Creek conduit, 
at its outfall at the Jordan River, was 272 cubic feet per second, 
which occurred on September 26, 1982, at 11:00 a.m. (R. 1149, 
Mitckes affidavit, para. 5.) 
5. Conduit maintenance includes the principle of "self-
cleaning," which recognizes that water passing through the conduit 
clears the conduit as it passes. (R. 1149, Mitckes affidavit, 
para. 16.) 
6. Following the thunderstorm of September, 1982, relatively 
little storm water drainage entered the City Creek conduit to leave 
behind sediment or debris because storms after that time would be 
in the form of snow, which did not melt until the following May. 
(R. 1149, Mitckes affidavit, para. 16.) 
7. Salt Lake County relied upon the fact that the extremely 
high flows of water resulting from the thunderstorm in September, 
1982 were carried successfully through the City Creek conduit to 
establish the fact that the conduit was clean and unobstructed in 
May, 1983. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 14, 43-44.) 
8. In addition to its reliance upon the capacity of the 
conduit to carry the waters of the 1982 September thunderstorm as 
proof that the conduit was clean and unobstructed, Salt Lake County 
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made further efforts to prepare the open channel portions of City 
Creek to carry the spring runoff in 1983 by cleaning debris from 
the creek bed upstream of Memory Grove and by dredging the Memory 
Grove pond to act as a debris settlement basin. (R. 581, Holzworth 
deposition, pp. 43-44.) 
9. Stanley Butts, Salt Lake City foreman over drainage crews 
during 1983, visually inspected the North Temple conduit prior to 
the 1983 runoff by opening manholes between Memory Grove to 700 
West and observed water flowing freely, with no apparent 
obstruction in the conduit. In addition to visual inspection, Mr. 
Butts inserted a metal rod into the flow and determined that only 
a few inches of silt and sand existed at the bottom of the conduit. 
(R. 1167, Butts affidavit, paras. 3-4.) 
10. Thousands of tons, perhaps ten thousand tons of debris, 
consisting of rocks, gravel, and earth material, were brought down 
City Creek and into the conduit underlying North Temple during the 
spring runoff flood of 1983. Entire banks of City Creek were 
washed into the flood waters for a distance more than five miles 
upstream of Memory Grove. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 44-45; 
R. 584, Haines deposition, p. 41.) 
11. More earth material was brought down by the flood waters 
in City Creek than was later found in the conduit under North 
Temple, plus the material picked up off of State Street as it was 
deposited there during the time the water of City Creek was 
diverted down State Street. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, p. 45.) 
12. The levels of silt and debris carried by City Creek were 
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so high that, after the waters of the Creek were diverted to State 
Street and deposited into storm drains underlying Fourth South, 
Eighth South, and Ninth South, the Fourth South drain became 
plugged, and the Eighth and Ninth South drains were under threat of 
also becoming plugged. (R. 584, Haines deposition, pp. 36-37.) 
13. Stream flow in City Creek during the spring runoff floods 
of 1983 exceeded by two times the previous historic high for 
runoff. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, p. 39.) 
14. The City Creek flood was one which was in excess of that 
which could statistically be expected to occur within City Creek 
once in a hundred years. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 39-
40.) 
15. Given the combination of record snow pack; a long, cold 
and wet spring; and sudden temperature shift from cold to extremely 
hot, the City Creek flood was one which was characterized by the 
Flood Control Director for Salt Lake County as unpredictable, 
unusual and unanticipated. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 37-
38.) 
16. Because of the record snowpack, a heavier than normal 
spring runoff was expected. However, the conditions which combined 
to make the flood one which was unpredictable, unusual and 
unanticipated did not all occur until mid-May, 1983. (R. 581, 
Holzworth deposition, pp. 5-6.) 
17. With respect to paragraph 11 of City's statement of 
facts, officials of Salt Lake City assumed total responsibility and 
control of the management of the City Creek flood waters. Salt 
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Lake County was in nominal control only because of its Ordinance 
(Sec. 7-2-1 et seq.), enacted under the authority of Sec. 17-8-5, 
Utah Code, 1953 as amended, which included City Creek as one of the 
County's natural channels over which County would exercise flood 
control authority. All decisions and actions relating to efforts 
to control flood waters in May and June, 1983 from Memory Grove 
through the conduit to the Jordan River were made by City 
officials. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 18-19, 31-33, 41-42, 
49; R. 584, Haines deposition, pp. 4-7.) 
18. Repairs to the conduit and North Temple, following the 
excavation thereof to remove the material plugging the conduit, 
could not be undertaken sooner than September, 1983, because of 
continued high water flows through the conduit which prevented 
engineering design. (R. 304-308, Langer affidavit, para. 6/Atch.) 
19. Temporary steel decking or concrete planks were not 
placed over the cut in North Temple where the road and conduit had 
been excavated for reasons of cost, safety, efficiency, and 
engineering necessity. (R. 304-308, Langer affidavit, para. 
6/Atch.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is before the Court for consideration of issues 
related to the following: (1) Were Defts negligent in the 
"operation and maintenance" of the conduit underlying North Temple 
and during the management of the flood waters in City Creek during 
the 1983 spring runoff flood? (2) If, so, were Defts immune from 
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suit for such negligence under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act? 
Establishment of negligence requires more than the allegation, 
even when the issue is before the courts on a motion for summary 
judgment. A plaintiff may not avoid the requirements of proof, 
even at that early stage of litigation, simply by claiming an issue 
of fact has been raised by the allegation. In this case, RockyMtn 
has utterly failed to do any more than cry, long and loud, that its 
allegations raise issues of fact which must be tried, even in the 
face of unrebutted, admissible evidence presented by Defts through 
depositions and supporting affidavits which clearly refutes 
RockyMtn's allegations. 
RockyMtn has alleged negligence by Defts in the operation and 
maintenance of the City Creek conduit. The only specific instance 
of such negligence subsequently addressed by RockyMtn is the 
alleged failure of Defts to inspect and clean the conduit in 
preparation for the runoff. As will be shown hereafter, such 
allegation is totally without proof. 
Even if there were a scintilla of evidence to support 
RockyMtn's allegation in this specific instance, Defts are immune 
from suit for claims arising therefrom under the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically, Sec. 63-30-10(4) 
(Section 63-30-10(1) (d) as the Act was written in 1983), which 
immunizes governmental entities from suit for claims arising out of 
"a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection." 
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Further, actions and decisions taken by Defts during the 
"inspection and maintenance" of the City Creek conduit were the 
exercise or performance of a discretionary function and any 
negligence occurring therein are immune under the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-10(1) (Sec. 63-30-
10(1)(a) as the Act was written in 1983.) 
The only specific allegation of negligence occurring during 
Defts' management of the flood waters is that Defts made improper 
attempts to clear the City Creek conduit after it became plugged. 
There is absolutely no evidence presented by RockyMtn to raise an 
issue of negligence in this instance. Further, the decisions and 
actions taken by Defts to clear the conduit in the midst of the 
attempt to control the flood waters of City Creek while those 
waters were at peak flow were the exercise or performance of a 
discretionary function and are thus immune from suit. 
RockyMtn makes a vague and non-specific allegation of 
negligence in Defts' decisions/actions relative to traffic control 
and repair of the conduit and North Temple after the road and 
conduit were broken open to remove the material which plugged the 
conduit. As will be shown hereafter, those actions were based upon 
sound reasons of policy and engineering necessity, which cannot, 
and have not, been rebutted. Even if there were evidence to 
support RockyMtn7s allegation in this regard, the decisions and 
actions of Defts in the repair of the conduit and North Temple 
involve the exercise or performance of a discretionary function and 
are therefore, under the provisions of Sec. 63-30-10(1), Utah Code, 
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1953 as amended, immune from suit for claims arising therefrom. 
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
RockyMtn persists in claiming that certain "facts" have been 
established which have no basis in the record. These "facts" have 
been the subject of repeated objections by Defts, yet they continue 
to appear in every argument made by RockyMtn in this case. 
The most egregious of these "facts" are those claimed to have 
been established by old reports of the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers. These "reports" are even referenced in this Court's 
previous decision in this matter (Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, 
Inc. , et al. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al., supra). At p. 
460 of said case, the Court states: 
Plaintiffs allege that defendants were well aware of 
the runoff hazards from City Creek but failed to take 
adequate precautions to prevent the damage caused by the 
1983 spring runoff. . . Plaintiffs rely on several 
affidavits and a series of reports from the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to substantiate their claims. 
The record of this case clearly establishes that these so-
called reports of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have never been 
properly submitted as required by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 56 (c) identifies the sources which may be looked 
to in deciding the propriety of summary judgment. Those sources 
are "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any." Goetz 
v. American Reliable Insurance Co., 844 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1992), 
at 372. The Corps of Engineers material to which RockyMtn has 
continually referred, and the "facts" which RockyMtn maintains are 
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established by said materials, simply have no lawful foundation. 
In requests for admissions, found at R. pp. 214-237, RockyMtn 
requested the defendants to admit to certain statements contained 
in certain Corps of Engineers documents. RockyMtn quoted extensive 
sections of said documents and then requested the defendants to 
admit to the averments of the same. At each request, defendants 
denied the truth of each and every statement. The only admission 
made was that the statements appeared to be an accurate copy of the 
statements made in the Corps of Engineers documents. See Answers 
to Requests for Admissions, R., 418-443. The documents themselves 
were never authenticated. Thereafter, copies of the documents were 
attached by RockyMtn as exhibits to their "Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants Salt Lake County and The State of Utah/s Motions for 
Summary Judgment," filed November 27, 1984. RockyMtn also simply 
asserted the contents of said reports in their memorandum in 
opposition to Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment. (See 
R. 294-302.) RockyMtn based their argument in said memoranda upon 
those exhibits, just as if they were proper evidence; and have been 
doing so ever since. The averments of those documents border on 
the bizarre, and are thoroughly discredited by persons such as 
Terry Holzworth, the County's director of flood control during the 
1983 spring runoff floods. (See Holzworth deposition, R. 581, pp. 
21-22, 50-52.) 
In its 1989 decision in this case, the Court recognized that 
the defendants are prepared to rebut these documents, but observed 
that the trial court did not reach the negligence issues. At this 
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point, however, this appeal is based directly upon RockyMtn's 
allegations of negligence and its utter lack of evidence in support 
thereof. Consequently, it is time for the Court to finally 
recognize that these documents, which RockyMtn has used to support 
"facts" in its latest brief, are not proper evidence as required by 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Each and every "fact" asserted by RockyMtn based upon those 
documents must be disregarded. For the Courts information, those 
"facts" as set forth in RockyMtn's brief, are as follows: 
On p. 4 of their brief, RockyMtn states, "In May of 1983, 
history repeated itself." As authority for said statement, 
RockyMtn cites a May 16, 1991 affidavit of Clark Lin. (RockyMtn 
cites this affidavit to be at page 1468 of the record. After an 
extensive search, counsel for Salt Lake County found that affidavit 
at page 1481.)* Reference to that affidavit shows the following 
statement: 
10. City Creek Canyon has an extensive flooding history 
and incidents were recorded ever since the days of early 
settlement. In October of 1969, and again in December of 
1978, the Department of the Army, Sacramento District, 
Corps of Engineers evaluated the flood characteristics of 
City Creek Canyon and determined that it is subject not 
only to flooding, but debris flow (such as rock and mud 
flows). These reports were prepared for the Utah 
Division of Water Resources and Salt Lake City and 
County, and advised them that the debris flow would clog 
the North Temple Storm Drain System leading to City 
Creek, and cause extensive damage to downtown Salt Lake 
*Note. This is the point in the record at which said 
affidavit was submitted to the court by RockyMtn's counsel. The 
last page of the affidavit, plus purported signature of Clark Lin, 
is an obvious facsimile; although RockyMtn7s counsel, Mr. Theodore, 
has executed, with an original ink signature, his representation 
that the affidavit was "subscribed and sworn to" before him. 
15 
City if allowed to enter the storm drain system. 
Mitigation measures were then recommended in the Corps of 
Engineers report. 
The affidavit thus repeats the unauthenticated hearsay of the 
reports already discussed. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states, "Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." 
"Rule 56(e) also requires that an affidavit in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence." fA.P. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 
820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991).] 
The affidavit of Mr. Lin wholly fails to meet these 
requirements. RockyMtn cannot bootstrap its Corps of Engineers' 
"reports" into the record through this affidavit. 
On page 5 of its brief, RockyMtn repeats the "fact" that "as 
early as 1979, the government possessed information, produced by 
the Army Corps of Engineers, that the City Creek Canyon area was 
vulnerable to massive sudden erosion and debris flow." This time, 
RockyMtn cites to the reporter's transcript of the parties' oral 
argument upon Defts' motions for summary judgment. Reference to a 
transcript of oral argument to establish "fact" is ludicrous. 
RockyMtn also cites to another affidavit of Mr. Lin, dated December 
10, 1990. (Again, the cite is to p. 1338 of the record. After 
another search, counsel found that affidavit at p. 1400.) That 
16 
affidavit contains a paragraph with the exact language as was 
written in the May 16, 1991 affidavit (quoted above). Again, that 
affidavit wholly fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56 (e). 
On page 6 of its brief, RockyMtn resorts once again to the 
"fact" that City Creek Canyon has an extensive history of flooding. 
Again, the May 16, 1991 affidavit of Mr. Lin is cited as the source 
of that "fact." 
On pages 6-7 of its brief, RockyMtn makes the following as a 
"statement of fact": "Despite the extensive history of flooding in 
this area, and despite foreknowledge of the high snowpack, and 
despite the fact that governmental authorities anticipated a 
higher-than-average spring runoff, the government failed to 
maintain the drainage system." Again, RockyMtn relies upon the May 
16, 1991 affidavit of Mr. Lin as the source of these "facts." 
RockyMtn's use of inadmissible documents as a basis for issues 
of fact is not the only problem with their "Statement of Facts". 
RockyMtn also cites to the deposition of County Flood Control 
Director, Terry Holzworth, page 6, to support a "fact" that Defts 
failed to maintain the City Creek drainage system. On that page, 
the following question was asked and answered: 
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) "Then basically did you do 
anything with respect to the pipeline itself along the 
North Temple viaduct. Was it cleaned out?" 
A. (By Mr. Holzworth) "We did not go to any 
efforts to specifically clean that conduit. We had 
opportunity to be in that, I can't give you a specific 
date, sometime between the fall of 1982 and the spring 
runoff, to repair one of the manholes out there out near 
the Fairgrounds, and we didn't have a report from our 
field people that there was any obstruction or 
accumulation in that storm drain, so we didn't have any 
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reason to believe that it wouldn't flow freely." 
Mr. Holzworth certainly made no statement to justify 
RockyMtn's assertion that, as a matter of "fact", defendants failed 
to maintain the drainage system. 
In making its "statement of fact" to say that the government 
failed to maintain the drainage system, RockyMtn conveniently 
ignores the following questions and answers of Mr. Holzworth, found 
at p. 14 of his deposition (R. 581): 
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) "Could you briefly describe 
your inspection system to determine when and how often a 
conduit should be cleaned?" 
A. (By Mr. Holzworth) ". . . A s far as this 
particular storm drain and any other conduit system Salt 
Lake County has responsibility for, the routine program 
so far has not evolved to the point where we have the 
ability to go in and clean those on a scheduled basis, so 
by and large the backing up of water or obstruction to 
the flow of the system are triggers toward the need for 
extensive work or cleaning work. 
"We've had flows in the vicinity of 160 cubic feet 
per second in the spring of 1982, also some summer storms 
in the summer and fall of 1982 and didn't have any 
problem demonstrating—no demonstrated problem with 
capacity in the City Creek or any other pipe system, so 
we were relying on that experience to tell us that 
obstructions were not there." 
On p. 44, the following questions and answers were given: 
Q. (By Mr. Cutler) "At no time was there ever any 
indication there was ever any impediment to the stream 
flow coming down through the North Temple conduit; is 
that right?" 
A. (By Mr. Holzworth) "That's correct, we had no 
indication of any obstruction." 
Q. "So you had formed an opinion then in your 
overall assignment of County resources that the North 
Temple drain was serviceable?" 
A. "That's correct." 
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Thus in arriving at their "statement of fact" that the 
government failed to maintain the drainage system, RockyMtn lifted 
information from Mr. Holzworth's deposition out of context, 
mischaracterized to this Court what Mr. Holzworth said, and ignored 
further testimony which established that Salt Lake County's 
maintenance system for the North Temple conduit was to respond to 
apparent blockages or impediments and remove them. Because runoff 
from summer and fall thunderstorms (including the tremendous 
thunderstorm of September, 1982) had passed through the conduit 
without problems, Mr. Holzworth made a determination that the 
conduit was clean. This is the exact opposite of RockyMtn7s "fact" 
that the government failed to maintain the conduit. 
By citing to Clark Lin's affidavit to support their "statement 
of fact" quoted above, RockyMtn again asks the Court to ignore the 
requirements of Rule 56(e). Nowhere does the affidavit establish 
that Mr. Lin bases his statements upon personal knowledge, set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show 
affirmatively that Mr. Lin is competent to testify as to the 
City's, County's, or State's program for inspection and maintenance 
of the North Temple conduit. 
RockyMtn continues in its "statement of facts" to make further 
representations to the Court which have no support as required by 
Rules 56 (c) and (e) . On page 7 of its brief, RockyMtn again 
asserts that "for several years prior to the flood, the government 
failed to clean the system." That assertion's cite to Mr. 
Holzworth's deposition, page 6, is totally erroneous, and the 
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assertion has no support in the record. 
RockyMtn asserts that the failure to maintain "allowed 
sediment to build-up in the North Temple culvert." This assertion 
cites to the record, pp. 1303-1308. Those pages, however, contain 
portions of two separate documents — "Plaintiffs Answers to Salt 
Lake City's First Set of Interrogatories," (Exhibit 'U' to Salt 
Lake City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed May 9, 1991) and "Supplemental Answers to Salt Lake 
City's Interrogatories to Plaintiffs," (Exhibit 'V to said 
Memorandum). Thus, whatever RockyMtn meant by its reference to 
those pages of the record is unknown. The assertion also cites Mr. 
Lin's deposition as the basis for the "fact." A review of that 
deposition, particularly that part cited, shows that Mr. Lin 
testifies as to matters which would not be admissible in court. 
Nowhere does he claim any personal knowledge, nor competence to 
give evidence concerning sediment build-up in the North Temple 
conduit. To make an assertion of "fact", Mr. Lin must have 
personal knowledge in order to testify as to a build-up of 
sediment. The assertion is not an expert opinion, which Mr. Lin, 
if he could qualify as an expert, could give based upon hearsay. 
Mr. Lin cannot, therefore, be used by RockyMtn to establish a 
"fact." 
The next assertion made by RockyMtn as "fact" states, "the 
sediment was a major factor in blocking flood water and in the 
subsequent flooding." Its cite to the record is to pp. 1050-1051, 
which is a portion of Mr. Lin's deposition, attached to Salt Lake 
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City's aforementioned memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment as Exhibit 'C.' Those pages contain no mention of 
a sediment build-up whatsoever. Again, whatever RockyMtn meant by 
reference to those pages is unknown. And, again, RockyMtn cites 
Mr. Lin's May 16, 1991, affidavit as support for this "fact." 
Although this discussion has been long and detailed, it is 
made to show what has been wrong with this case from the beginning. 
RockyMtn has continually made bald allegations and, when challenged 
for proof, refers the challenger to more allegations, or to 
hearsay. This detailed analysis of RockyMtn's "Statement of Facts" 
is presented to show the Court that RockyMtn has not complied with 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor with Rule 24 (a) (7) and 
(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY (AND CITY) WAS NOT NEGLIGENT REGARDING 
INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE OF THE NORTH TEMPLE CONDUIT 
RockyMtn alleges that Defts were negligent in the inspection/ 
maintenance of the North Temple conduit. Beyond that allegation 
there is nothing. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence 
to support the allegation. The best RockyMtn can do is point to 
the deposition and affidavits of Clark Lin. Examination of those 
materials shows that Mr. Lin is asserting a lack of maintenance/ 
inspection upon two bases: (1) That the materials found in the 
conduit during the clean-out process were "dry", "cementitious", 
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and "hard-packed clay"; and (2) the fact that the conduit plugged 
in the first place. 
As to (1) , Mr. Lin's deposition makes clear that he has no 
personal knowledge of the condition of the materials found in the 
conduit when it was cleaned out. He was not there. He did not 
review a soils report. There was no analysis of the materials. He 
bases his description, and opinion, upon the deposition of Frank 
Helm. 
Mr. Helm testified in his deposition as follows regarding the 
material found in the conduit: 
"Q. (By Mr. Theodore) The type of debris, the 
largest size you indicated was around a two-foot diameter 
boulder? 
"A. (By Mr. Helm) We took boulders, cobbles, the 
creek run cobbles out approximately two-foot in diameter 
and down. It was varying. It was almost a cementitious 
material. It was very dense and hard packed in this 
area. 
"Q. Could you tell how long that material had been 
in the pipe to become in a cementitious compaction? 
"A. No, I couldn't because I'm not a geologist. I 
wouldn't — it could have been in two weeks or it could 
have been in two years or it could have come down with 
the flood from City Creek. 
ffQ. So you couldn't make an opinion one way or the 
other? 
,fA. No, sir, I wouldn't. 
"Q. Okay. The nature of the compaction, was it a 
cement-like consistency at the time that you were going 
through or is it— 
"A. No, When I say cementitious, it was very 
densely packed. 
"Q. But it wasn't anything that would be considered 
a cement type of aggregate that had plugged the entire 
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pipe? You are talking about densely compacted material? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And could you tell whether there was a gradient 
on the material, whether the large objects had settled to 
the bottom or were they all add mixed in a uniform type 
of mixture or do you recall? 
,fA. I would say that where we started boring, it 
was pretty uniformly mixed because there was fines in 
it." (R. 583, Helm deposition, pp. 24-25.) 
Mr. Helm does not describe the material found in the conduit 
any further. In particular, he makes no statement concerning the 
relative wetness or dryness of the material. Nor does he make any 
reference to the material as "clay." 
We now turn to the testimony of Mr. Lin, the witness upon whom 
RockyMtn relies to make its claim of negligence. His deposition 
states as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Baird) You told me that the pipes were 
plugged before the flood, correct? 
MA. (By Mr. Lin) Correct. 
"Q. What do you base that on, sir? 
"A. Well, from the depositions, you know, I read 
that shows what the — I mean the pipes — you know, the 
mud — not the mud — the materials in the pipe are dry 
clays. 
"Q. Whose deposition did you read that in, sir? 
"A. I don't recall the name. I have to go through 
them. 
"Q. Take your time. Point me to every page, sir, 
in those depositions where anyone tells you that the 
pipes were plugged up with hard clay. 
"A. Could I talk to my lawyer? 
"Mr. Baird: Yes, I'll let you. 
23 
(Discussion held off the record between the witness 
and Mr. Theodore.) 
"The Witness: I remember where they had to auger 
the pipes. 
"Q. (By Mr. Baird) Does augering the pipes, sir, 
necessarily mean that the material in it was hard-packed 
clay? 
"A. Yes. I mean, it's hard. 
"Q. You never auger anything other than hard-packed 
clay; is that correct? 
"A. Not necessarily. 
(Time lapse.) 
"Q. While you're looking, let me look through this 
other one. 
"A. Go ahead. I think this is the only one I'll be 
looking at. 
(Time lapse.) 
The Witness: Okay. 
"Q. You found it? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Tell me what page and line it is, sir. 
"A. It's in the conversation on pages 24, 25, 26 
through about 27. 
"Q. That's the deposition of who? 
"A. Frank Helm. 
"Q. . . . Is there any other source, sir, for you 
to understand that this material was dry or hardened 
clay? 
"A. No." 
"Q (By Mr. Baird) I'm reading from a portion of 
Mr. Helm's testimony. Tell me if this is what you're 
relying on. 
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'Question: Could you tell how long that 
material had been in the pipe to become in a 
cementitious compaction? 
'Answer: No, I couldn't because I'm not 
a geologist. I wouldn't — It could have been in two 
weeks, or it could have been in two years, or it could 
have come down with the flood from City Creek. 
'Question: So you couldn't make an 
opinion one way or another? 
'Answer: No sir, I wouldn't.' 
Correct? You just read that; correct? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. If Mr. Helm who was there says that he can't 
tell whether it came down two weeks before, two years 
before or with the flood, how can you, sir, sitting here 
tell me that you know that that material didn't come down 
either two weeks before or with the flood? 
"A. Okay. I — I read both. All right. And I 
form my own opinion." (R. 1047, Lin deposition, pp. 13-
16.)* 
It is conceded that one testifying as an expert does not 
necessarily have to have first-hand knowledge of the material upon 
which the expert opinion is based. (Rule 705, Utah Rules of 
Evidence.) However, just because one is called as an expert 
witness does not mean that everything to which he testifies is an 
expert opinion. An expert witness may not relate hearsay when it 
is not part of an expert opinion. In this case, Mr. Lin is 
*Note: Although the deposition is contained in the record at 
this point as an exhibit to Salt Lake City's memorandum in support 
of its motion for summary judgment, the deposition was published on 
motion of counsel for Salt Lake County. See the transcript of the 
hearing upon said motion, R. Vol. V, p. 31.) 
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describing the materials found in the conduit. That does not 
require an expert opinion. What it does require is personal 
knowledge of the materials. That is something Mr. Lin does not 
have, and his description of the materials as dry, cementitious, 
hard-packed, clay is inadmissible hearsay. Worse than that, it 
doesn't even accurately repeat the description given by Mr. Helm, 
who did have first-hand knowledge of the material in the conduit. 
Since Mr. Lin's "expert opinion" that the conduit was plugged 
before the runoff started is based upon a non-existent set of 
"facts", it is no opinion at all, and cannot be used by RockyMtn to 
prove its allegation of negligence in the inspection/maintenance of 
the conduit. Without that "expert opinion", RockyMtn has no 
evidence whatsoever that lack of inspection/maintenance caused the 
conduit to plug. Thus summary judgment on that issue was properly 
granted. 
As to (2), above, Mr. Lin has claimed that the mere fact the 
conduit became plugged proves that there was no inspection/ 
maintenance of the drainage system. This is nothing more than a 
resort to res ipsa loquitur in a situation where it is not 
permitted. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires a plaintiff to 
prove three elements: (1) The accident was of a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not have happened in the 
absence of negligence; (2) the agency or instrumentality causing 
the accident was at the time of the accident under the exclusive 
management or control of the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff's own 
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use or operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the accident. [King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.. 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992).] 
Ultimately. . . to establish a res ipsa loquitur case, 
the plaintiff must lay a foundation from which it can be 
established that negligence was probably the cause of the 
injury. The law is clear that an undesired complication 
or result. . . does not by itself imply that the result 
was caused by someone's breach of a duty of due care. 
[Id., at 862.] 
In the instant case the factors which combined in May, 1983 to 
produce the historic floods occurring throughout the State of Utah 
were obviously not within the management or control of the 
defendants. The tremendous amount of earth materials brought down 
during the flood, which ultimately caused the blockage, were a 
direct result of the combination of factors of record snowpack; 
late, wet and cold spring; sudden temperature shift from cold to 
very hot. None of those factors was within the defendants' 
control. Control of the debris within the flood was also not 
within the exclusive control of the defendants. To even attempt 
such control, defendants would have had to design and construct a 
debris-collection and drainage system far more extensive than was 
feasible, given the extremely rare occurrence of such floods vis-a-
vis the high cost to the citizens of Salt Lake County to install 
such a system. Since this Court has previously ruled in Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores, supra. that defendants cannot be sued for 
the exercise of its discretionary powers concerning the extent of 
the drainage system it must install to protect citizens of Salt 
Lake County, it cannot now be argued that the defendants have 
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exclusive control over the debris-laden flood waters which are the 
source of RockyMtn's complaint. Further, defendants would never 
know when it has installed a sufficient drainage system to stop all 
flooding. That fact alone establishes the no one can have 
exclusive management and control over the causes of flood. 
Therefore, since res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this 
case, Mr. Lin's assertion that negligence in inspection/ 
maintenance of the conduit is established by the mere fact that the 
conduit became plugged cannot be used by RockyMtn to avoid summary 
judgment. 
POINT II 
ALL DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FROM CLAIMS 
ARISING OUT OF A FAILURE TO MAKE AN INSPECTION 
OR BY MAKING A NEGLIGENT OR INADEQUATE INSPECTION 
The point raised herein was relied upon by the trial court as 
a basis for grant of summary judgment to defendants. That court's 
analysis is adopted for purposes of this argument. The court 
stated, 
Lin used the terms "maintenance" and "inspection" 
interchangeably, but it is clear that a regular "program" 
of inspection would be either the precursor to or a part 
of maintenance. As such, it is subject to either the 
applicable statutory provision immunizing government 
conduct relating to inspections or failures to inspect or 
is the result of a policy decision not to have a regular 
program for inspection and maintenance and thus entitled 
to discretionary immunity. (R. 1579, Summary Decision 
and Order.) 
In Ledfors v. Emery County School District. 849 P.2d 1162 
(Utah 1993), this Court construed the meaning of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act's language which retains immunity for 
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governmental entities from claims "arising" out of certain 
situations. In that case, which involved claims for damages to a 
child injured by a beating received at the hands of other students, 
plaintiffs brought suit against the school district alleging a 
failure to supervise. The school district defended upon the basis 
that Sec. 63-30-10 (2) , Utah Code, 1953 as amended, retained 
immunity for claims arising out of assaults. This Court stated, 
(W)e likewise find no merit in the Ledforses' argument 
that the injuries alleged here arose from the failure to 
supervise rather than from a battery. Again, our prior 
cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose 
out of" conduct or a situation specifically described in 
one of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then immunity 
is preserved. We have rejected claims that have 
reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury. [Id., 
at 1166.] 
In the instant case, RockyMtn attempts to categorize its claim 
as a "failure to maintain" the conduit (although RockyMtn also 
often characterizes the alleged fault of defendants as a "failure 
to inspect"). However, as stated by Judge Murphy, "(I)t is clear 
that a regular 'program' of inspection would be either the 
precursor to or a part of maintenance." (Summary Decision and 
Order, supra.) Thus, whether characterized as "maintenance" or 
"inspection", defendants actions in regard to monitoring the North 
Temple conduit are immune under the provisions of Sec. 63-30-10(4). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF 
THE EXERCISE OR PERFORMANCE OF A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
A program of inspection and maintenance for storm drainage 
conduits necessarily involves the exercise of a discretionary 
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function. This Court has stated four factors to consider in 
determining whether actions of a governmental entity qualify as 
"discretionary functions." [Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam. 
Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), reiterated in Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores, supra.1 Those factors are discussed as follows: 
1. "Does the challenged act, omission or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program or 
objective?" 
Salt Lake County's program for the carrying away and safe 
disposal of natural storm and flood waters is based upon specific 
authorization of the legislature, found in Sec. 17-8-5, Utah Code. 
This Court has already found that activities relating to flood 
control management in City Creek Canyon are governmental functions. 
fRocky Mountain Thrift Stores, supra, at 462.] There is no 
qualitative difference between utilization of the North Temple 
conduit for carrying away storm and flood waters of City Creek and 
the utilization of conduits for carrying away storm and flood 
waters in any other natural watercourse, such as Emigration Creek, 
Mill Creek, etc., or, for the carrying away storm and flood waters 
from subdivision streets. It is therefore contended that the 
installation and maintenance of a storm drainage system involves a 
basic government policy, program or objective. The criteria of 
this first of four factors are clearly met in this case. 
2. "Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential 
to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program or 
objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or 
30 
direction of the policy, program, or objective?" 
The questioned act here is whether to inspect/maintain the 
conduits which carry storm and flood waters. Once a drainage 
system, which includes conduits, is constructed, the level of 
maintenance to be provided thereafter is an essential consideration 
in the overall effectiveness of the system. Depending upon the 
decisions made by the governmental entity's governing body as to 
the inspection/maintenance to be provided, a storm drainage system 
can remain at design capacity, or diminish to the point as if the 
system had not been constructed in the first place. It is 
therefore submitted that installation and maintenance of a storm 
drainage system meets the second of these four factors. 
3. "Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise 
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of 
the governmental agency involved?" 
The level of inspection/maintenance to be provided all or part 
of a storm drainage system calls into issue all of the policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise that is required to decide 
whether to install the system in the first place, as well as the 
design characteristics to be included during the installation. 
Each time inspection and maintenance of a drainage system is 
considered, policy makers must weigh the competing needs of other 
government programs for funds. An appropriation in one program 
will necessarily lessen the funds available for another program. 
The tax burden to be levied upon the citizens is involved in every 
budget process. Flood control officials must make reasoned 
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decisions whether a particular channel must be cleaned to meet 
anticipated needs. Differing weather patterns affect those 
decisions. An official may reason, for example, that because there 
was very little snowpack during a winter season that runoff will be 
so slight as to not require rigorous cleaning of water channels to 
prepare for it; consequently, his available funds would be better 
utilized that year for construction of an expanded drainage system. 
On the other hand, the need for clearing water channels may appear 
so great in order to prepare for an immense snow pack runoff that 
the flood control official will have to decide which area is most 
at risk for flooding and devote his resources accordingly. A good 
example of the expertise and judgment required in this area is 
provided in this case. Terry Holzworth, Salt Lake County flood 
control director, testified that he had determined that conduits in 
the County would be cleaned when obstructions appeared, rather than 
conduct regularly scheduled inspection/maintenance which may or may 
not be needed. He made the decision with the knowledge that his 
resources would be stretched very thin while his department worked 
to prepare the watercourses in the County for the 1983 spring 
runoff. He used his expertise and judgment to decide that the 
North Temple conduit was clean and unobstructed because it had 
successfully carried the extremely high urban runoff from the 
previous September's cloudburst without serious problems. Instead, 
he concentrated the efforts and funds of the flood control division 
to cleaning and preparing the open channel portion of City Creek, 
upstream of Memory Grove, as well as to the channels of other 
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watercourses throughout the County. It is therefore submitted, 
that inspection/maintenance of drainage systems meets this third of 
four factors. 
4. "Does the governmental agency involved possess the 
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty 
to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?" 
The previous discussion establishes that this factor is 
clearly met. Also, Section 17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, 
clearly places authority in Salt Lake County to plan for and 
construct drainage systems for storm and flood runoff. 
Therefore, Judge Murphy correctly ruled that a determination 
whether to conduct a regular program of inspection and maintenance, 
or not, is the result of a policy decision and is thus entitled to 
discretionary immunity. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE REPAIR AND 
RESTORATION OF NORTH TEMPLE AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF AN 
OPEN EXCAVATION UNTIL REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED 
In a vague and off-handed way, RockyMtn claims they were 
damaged because Defts were negligent in the manner in which they 
conducted the repair and restoration of North Temple after the 
street and conduit were opened to clean out the materials which 
blocked the conduit. RockyMtn's allegation in this regard is set 
forth in the First Cause of Action of their Complaint. As 
explained above, that cause of action was not pursued by RockyMtn 
and soon became moot. However, in the Second Cause of Action, 
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RockyMtn may be deemed to have repeated their allegation in para. 
26 of the complaint, which states, "Plaintiffs replead and reallege 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 of the First 
Cause of Action." 
Beyond that allegation, RockyMtn has presented absolutely no 
evidence through depositions, interrogatories, admissions, or 
affidavits to provide any proof of the allegation. However, in 
response to the allegation, Salt Lake County submitted an affidavit 
in support of its motion for summary judgment. That affidavit was 
prepared by Wilfried Langer, vice-president of J.M. Montgomery 
Consulting Engineers, Inc. It is a direct refutation of RockyMtn's 
allegation of negligence in the defendants7 maintenance of an open 
excavation after the conduit and street were opened to clean the 
conduit, the refusal to place steel decking or concrete planks over 
the excavation, and in the start of repairs. The affidavit is at 
pp. 304-308 of the record on appeal. The facts stated in said 
affidavit are absolutely undisputed by RockyMtn in any way, shape, 
or form. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states as follows: 
. . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
It is well established that upon submission of Mr. Langer's 
affidavit, RockyMtn is required to submit responsive affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e). Upon its 
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failure to do so, the trial court could properly conclude that 
there are no genuine issues of fact and, on the basis of applicable 
law, enter summary judgment in favor of the defendants. fCowen and 
Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984).] 
Consequently, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in regard 
to this allegation of negligence made by RockyMtn. 
POINT V 
SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFFS TO CONTROL 
THE 1983 SPRING RUNOFF FLOOD, NOR TO INSTALL, INSPECT, 
OR MAINTAIN A DRAINAGE SYSTEM FOR CITY CREEK 
Salt Lake County has no statutory duty to provide for any 
flood control of City Creek, nor of any other channel within the 
County. 
Salt Lake County's role in the control of flood and storm 
waters for the benefit of the citizens residing in the County is 
based upon the authority provided by Sec. 17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953 
as amended. That statute states: 
In anticipation of and to provide for the carrying away 
and the safe disposal of natural storm and flood waters, 
the board of county commissioners may remove any obstacle 
from any natural channel within the county and the 
incorporated municipalities in the county. For the same 
purpose, the board may plan for and construct new 
channels, storm sewers and drains to serve as though they 
were natural channels . . . The board of commissioners 
may also provide for the maintenance, improvement and 
fencing of all such channels, including covering or 
replacement with buried conduits. . . . 
By this statute, the legislature authorized counties to engage 
in flood and storm water control through use and regulation of 
natural channels, as well as to establish new channels to serve as 
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though they were natural channels. The amount, quality, level, and 
type of flood control effort is left to the discretion of the board 
of commissioners. The statute imposes no mandate or duty for any 
flood control, but only an authority to act which the board "may" 
exercise. In Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt 
Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983), at 1035, this Court stated, 
"This Court assumes that the terms of a statute are used advisedly 
and should be given an interpretation and application which is in 
accord with their usually accepted meanings." A provision of a 
statute couched in permissive terms is generally regarded as 
discretionary unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. In 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971), this 
Court found the word "may," in a statute pertaining to the land 
board, not to import certainty, but uncertainty; and thus, the 
reasonable deduction to be made was that the ordinary meaning of 
the term "may" was that one "may" or "may not" act. "If the 
legislature had intended an absolute right . . . instead of saying 
that an applicant 'may have his contract reinstated, ' it could 
easily have used the word 'shall' or 'must,' and thus have rendered 
a mandatory meaning clear." (Id.. at 1036-1037.) 
Similarly, the term "may" in Sec. 17-8-5 vests the board of 
county commissioners with discretion as to the amount or extent of 
flood and storm water management it will provide. The County had 
no "duty" to provide RockyMtn any particular kind, type, or degree 
of protection from natural storm and runoff waters. 
Salt Lake County's authority in this area is similar to the 
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authority granted Salt Lake City under the provisions of Sec. 10-8-
38, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, wherein it states: 
Boards of commissioners, city councils and boards of 
trustees of cities and towns may construct, reconstruct, 
maintain and operate, sewer systems, sewage treatment 
plants, culverts, drains, sewers, catch basins, manholes, 
cesspools and all systems, equipment and facilities 
necessary to the proper drainage . . . requirements of 
the city or town and regulate the construction and use 
thereof• 
POINT VI 
SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD NO ROLE IN MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS 
OF CITY CREEK DURING THE ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL SAID WATERS 
AND NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR CITY'S ACTIONS 
It is an undisputed fact that officials of Salt Lake City made 
all decisions, and took all actions, involved with the management 
of the flood waters of City Creek during the period in which the 
North Temple conduit became plugged, and in the attempts to remove 
that obstruction. Salt Lake City stands on a equal footing with 
Salt Lake County as regards municipal authority within the State of 
Utah, and has never been considered to be the agent of Salt Lake 
County in the provision of municipal services or exercise of police 
power. As this Court made crystal clear in Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph v. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 
1985) (utility franchise fees case) , and Salt Lake City Corporation 
v. Salt Lake County. 550 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1976) ("double taxation" 
case) , cities and counties are not alter egos of each other, and 
are not agents of the other. Each one has its separately ordained 
powers and responsibilities. Therefore, RockyMtn's allegations of 
negligence which involve those actions and decisions taken by 
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officials of Salt Lake City during their attempts to manage the 
flood waters of City Creek and the removal of the obstruction in 
the North Temple conduit do not raise allegations of negligence 
against Salt Lake County. 
POINT VII 
CLARK LIN CANNOT PROVIDE COMPETENT TESTIMONY 
TO ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF DEFENDANTS 
In every instance where Defts present evidence, in the form 
required by Rule 56(e), RockyMtn attempts to avoid judgment by 
claiming that Clark Lin, as an expert, has raised a "question of 
fact" which requires the case to go to trial. However, as alluded 
to above, Mr. Lin has not saved the case for RockyMtn because he 
has not, and cannot, provide evidence as required by Rule 56(e). 
In Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992), this Court 
held, 
(T)he drafters (of Rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence) did 
not intend to exempt expert affidavits in opposition to 
summary judgment from rule 56(e)'s requirement that 
affidavits set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial. We therefore follow the path 
laid down in Williams [ Will jams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723 
(Utah 1985) ] to the explicit holding that affidavits must 
include not only the expert's opinion, but also the 
specific facts that logically support the expert's 
conclusions. . . In so doing, we stress the requirement 
that rule 56(e) requires specific facts. . . (A) bare 
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and 
based his or her opinion on them will not suffice. (Id. , 
at 104.) 
Long sections of Mr. Lin's deposition have already been quoted 
herein to show that he cannot point to specific facts which support 
his opinion of negligence. RockyMtn apparently recognized that 
failing, and made one last attempt, through submission of Mr. Lin's 
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affidavit dated May 16, 1991, to raise a genuine issue of fact. 
Most of that affidavit has been discussed above, particularly as it 
references the non-existent reports of the Army Corps of Engineers. 
The remainder of that affidavit is now examined. 
Mr. Lin states that 
(I)t is practical to handle debris flows or sediment 
laden flows with a system of debris basins and open 
channels as practiced in jurisdictions such as Los 
Angeles and Las Vegas. If an enclosed pipe system must 
be used, such as the subject of these proceedings, it is 
standard procedure in the industry to install debris 
basins to prevent the debris or large amounts of sediment 
from entering the pipe system and to employ a program of 
maintenance and inspection to insure that the pipes are 
kept clean to prevent blockage of the flow passages. (R. 
1482, Lin affidavit, para. 11.) 
Not only does Mr. Lin's statement fail to relate any specific 
facts to support his opinion, his opinion at this point addresses 
an area which has already been ruled by this Court to be immune 
from suit. The design and capacity of the City Creek drainage 
system has been ruled to be a discretionary function. 
Mr. Lin goes on to say, "These enclosed pipe systems quickly 
lose their ability to convey water and debris if they are not 
cleaned as often as necessary, usually at least once a year before 
the spring runoff" (emphasis added). (R. 1482-1483, Lin affidavit, 
para. 11.) Mr. Lin recognizes that the basic requirement for 
cleaning is "as necessary." That is the same standard applied by 
Flood Control Director, Terry Holzworth, who relied upon 
impediments or blockages to tell him that a conduit needed 
cleaning. Moreover, as the Defts' affidavits, answers, and 
depositions in this case clearly show, there was no blockage in the 
39 
conduit prior to the runoff. The conduit was clean, made so by the 
prior September's massive cloudburst, which was carried through the 
North Temple conduit without problems. (See Mitckes' affidavit, R. 
1149.) 
Mr. Lin goes on to say, "In his opinion, it was not good, 
accepted engineering practice for Salt Lake County in 1983 not to 
have a program to regularly inspect and clean the North Temple 
conduits (sic) leading to City Creek at least once each year before 
the spring runoff." (R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para. 12.) Again, 
Mr. Lin has no specific facts upon which to base his opinion. The 
facts are that Salt Lake County did have a program to inspect and 
clean conduits. It's "trigger" for cleaning, as stated by 
Mr.Holzworth, is an indication of reduced flow. Mr. Lin has 
already admitted that the important requirement is to clean as 
often as is necessary. His once per year standard has no logical 
support. 
Mr. Lin then states, 
Given the extensive five block long clog of the 7 foot 
diameter North Temple segment of the City Creek drainage 
system, in his opinion the conduits already contained 
extensive sediment deposits accumulated from the past 
before the 1983 Spring run-off, and consequently plugged 
as predicted by the Department of the Army Sacramento 
District, Corps of Engineers. (R. 1483, Lin affidavit, 
para. 13.) 
The Corps of Engineers "predictions" have already been 
discussed. They are inadmissible and cannot support Mr. Lin's 
opinion. Besides, all Mr. Lin has done here is repeat his 
"opinion" that the conduit was filled with sediment, even though 
such a statement is one of fact and requires personal knowledge. 
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As has been repeatedly stressed, Mr. Lin has no facts upon which to 
give an opinion that the conduit would have been any more clean and 
ready for the 1983 runoff than if Salt Lake County had sent an army 
of workers through the conduit with brooms and dust pans on May 15, 
1983. 
In his next paragraph, Mr. Lin further opines concerning the 
negligence arising from certain facts, i.e., diversion of all of 
the City Creek above ground through a man made channel before the 
conduit was plugged. (R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para. 14.) That may 
be all right if only the "facts" stated as the premise of Mr. Lin's 
opinion were facts. However, The City has thoroughly refuted those 
"facts" and Mr. Lin has no other basis for the opinion. (It is 
interesting, however, to note that in this paragraph of his 
affidavit, Mr. Lin recognizes that the City Creek conduit has a 
11
 self-cleaning" capacity. This is exactly what Mr. Holzworth and 
Salt Lake County relied upon as part of its conduit maintenance 
program.) 
Next, Mr. Lin tries to refute (R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para. 
15) Defts' May 9, 1991 affidavit of Stephen Mitckes (R. 1149), 
which established the flows in the City Creek conduit in September, 
1982, and between May 24, 1983 and June 3, 1983. Mitckes' 
affidavit showed that the conduit carried up to 272 cfs in 
September, 1982; and carried up to 206 cfs between May 24, 1983 and 
June 8, 1983, when the conduit plugged. The effect of these 
measurements is clearly that the conduit could not have been filled 
with sediment before the 1983 spring runoff because it carried up 
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to the conduit's capacity for several days before it finally 
plugged. All Mr. Lin does in his affidavit to refute the meaning 
and effect of these facts is to say, "Mitckes has not provided 
sufficient data to establish the reliability of his flow 
measurements." Where are Mr. Lin's facts, as required by Rule 
56(e)? 
POINT VIII 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 4-501, CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
The trial court has identified the failure of RockyMtn to meet 
the requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(b) in response to Defts' motions 
for summary judgment. The rule must be enforced in order for it to 
have any meaning. Parties should not be allowed to ignore the 
rulef make no attempt to marshal its facts for the trial court, and 
then obtain relief from the appellate courts. The rule is 
extremely easy to understand, and puts no unfair burden on the 
parties to a lawsuit. As this case perfectly exemplifies, nearly 
complete disorganization will result when the rules aren't 
followed. Salt Lake County joins with other defendants in urging 
this Court to set a standard which requires parties to comply with 
Rule 4-501(2) or else the offending party may not claim to have 
facts before the courts which will avoid summary judgment. This 
court will never have a better case than this one with which to set 
this reasonable rule. Since enforcement of the plain language of 
Rule 4-501(2) in such a manner in this case creates no new burdens, 
nor deprives any party of rights which they can claim to have had 
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prior to establishment of Rule 4-501, this Court should hold 
RockyMtn has not established any facts in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
So many unsupported claims and allegations have been made by 
RockyMtn in this case that it has been difficult to focus this 
brief. And, as this appeal is from a summary judgment, every 
allegation must be examined in order to foreclose RockyMtn from 
claiming that it has raised an issue of fact and is thus entitled 
to trial. 
Nevertheless, Salt Lake County has painstakingly attempted 
herein to show that RockyMtn has not one single fact before the 
Court which would entitle it to a trial, whether or not Rule 4-
501(2)(b) is enforced against RockyMtn. 
Simply stated, RockyMtn has not submitted before the Court, by 
way of affidavit, deposition, answer, or admission, as required by 
Rule 56(c) and (e) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any facts to 
support the allegations of its pleadings. Particularly, it has not 
responded to Defts' refutation of those allegations. All RockyMtn 
has done is claim that its allegations entitle it to a trial. 
RockyMtn alleged negligence in the failure to "inspect and 
maintain" the conduit. The only failure claimed is a failure to 
clean before the runoff. Defts have denied, with admissible 
evidence, that allegation. RockyMtn has not overcome that denial 
with any evidence whatsoever. 
Additionally, Salt Lake County claims the benefit of the 
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Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-10 (1) and (4) , upon the 
defense that the maintenance program of the County is a 
discretionary function and/or claims arising out a failure to 
inspect are immune from suit. 
Salt Lake County is also entitled to the defense allowed by 
Sec. 63-30-10 (1) upon the premise that it is has no duty to 
provide RockyMtn with protection from floods or flooding. The 
County's program is based upon an authorization from the 
legislature to plan for, and construct, storm and flood water 
drainage. The extent of that drainage, which necessarily includes 
the type and amount of maintenance the County can afford, involves 
discretionary decisions. Giving RockyMtn the benefit of every 
allegation in this case only shows a complaint that Defts didn't do 
more for them. RockyMtn cannot point to a single act or omission 
of Defts which put it in danger of damage from a dangerous 
condition created by Defts after the discretionary decisions were 
made and effectuated. 
RockyMtn then claims damage from a negligent failure to 
immediately repair the conduit and North Temple. Salt Lake County 
has unequivocally countered that allegation with the affidavit of 
the engineer retained to complete that work. RockyMtn fails to 
respond to that affidavit as required by Rule 56(e). 
In short, Defts are entitled to summary judgment on the basis 
of governmental immunity. That is so, even accepting RockyMtn's 
allegations as fact. But in the main, RockyMtn has not countered 
the refutations by Defts of each and every instance of negligence 
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it has alleged. It simply has no evidence to back up its claims. 
Salt Lake County therefore requests this Court to sustain 
Judge Murphy's reasoned order of summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of June, 1993. 
KEVAN F. SMITH 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant, Salt Lake 
County 
2001 South State Street, Suite S-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
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—r9-»$i<3 *j%j&tctext District 
SEP 4 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, : SUMMARY DECISION 
INC., dba HOPE OF AMERICA AND ORDER 
THRIFT STORE, et al., : 
Plaintiffs, : CIVIL NO. C-83-6678 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
This matter comes before the Court on a series of motions: 
defendants' motions for summary judgment; plaintiffs' motion to 
amend the complaint; and defendant Salt Lake City's motion for 
contempt. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants' negligence in 
managing the flood waters of 1983 and specifically the North 
Temple storm drain caused serious disruption to plaintiffs' 
businesses when North Temple had to be excavated. 
Both of the remaining defendants, Salt Lake City ("the 
City") and Salt Lake County ("the County") have moved for 
summary judgment on numerous grounds. Plaintiffs' responses to 
these motions is wholly inadequate. Plaintiffs have failed to 
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adhere to there requirements of Rule 4-501(2) (b). This failure 
is significant in a complex case such as this where adherence 
to the rule is a necessity for the Court to sort through 
complex theories, allegations and factual setting. If the 
Court in this Summary Decision has misapprehended or failed to 
acknowledge any genuine issue of material fact, it is because 
plaintiffs have not adhered to Rule 4-501 or otherwise submit 
their theories and evidence in an understandable manner. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court should 
determine whether the alleged negligence related to inspection 
or to maintenance and operation, whether the alleged negligence 
was the result of policy decisions or operational decisions, 
and other defenses raised by defendants. Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 464 (1989). 
In response to the defendants' claim that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact concerning their negligence, 
plaintiffs suggest the following areas of negligence have some 
evidentiary support: (1) failure to clean the storm drain 
prior to the flood; (2) the use of a dragline which in turn 
allegedly precluded the use of augering equipment; (3) the use 
of a 12 inch auger rather than a 48 inch auger; (4) the use of 
blasting in the clogged drain; (5) the use of fire hoses; (6) 
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the covering of the inlet with a metal plate and allowing 
debris to thereafter settle. 
In support of their claim that genuine issues of material 
fact exist concerning the six areas of alleged negligence, 
plaintiffs refer to the deposition of Dr. Clark A. Lin and his 
affidavit. Never do plaintiffs refer to page numbers in the 
Lin deposition nor do they reference a particular affidavit of 
Lin. The Court has gone the extra step of reviewing the 
entirety of the Lin deposition of April 22, 1991. 
Additionally, the Court has reviewed the May 16, 1991 affidavit 
of Lin which was attached to one of plaintiffs' responsive 
memoranda. In reviewing the materials submitted by the City in 
support of its motion, the Court discovered an earlier 
affidavit of Lin dated December 10, 1990. Plaintiffs did not 
direct the Court's attention to that particular affidavit. If 
there are any other affidavits of Lin, the Court is unaware and 
no further specific affidavits have been referenced. 
Construing the December 10, 1990 and May 16, 1991 
affidavits and the Lin deposition in a light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, the following can be inferred: defendants were 
negligent in failing "to employ a program of maintenance and 
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1 inspection to insure that the pipes are kept clean." At 
times Lin used the terms "maintenance11 and "inspection" 
interchangeably, but it is clear that a regular "program" of 
inspection would be either the precursor to or a part of 
maintenance. As such, it is subject to either the applicable 
statutory provision immunizing government conduct relating to 
inspections or failures to inspect or is the result of a policy 
decision not to have a regular program for inspection and 
maintenance and thus entitled to discretionary immunity. Under 
either scenario, defendants' claimed negligence due to failure 
to inspect and maintain is within the legislated governmental 
immunity. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., supra. 
There is some testimony from him that the use of a dragline 
was not good engineering practice. The only consequence 
flowing from this to which Lin testified was that it 
complicated augering, delayed augering for some indeterminant 
period and reflected panic management. Even assuming the use 
of the dragline was negligent, there is no admissible evidence 
that such use caused any damage. 
1
 December 10, 1990 affidavit, paragraph 11. 
Substantially the same statement is repeated in paragraph 12 
and in the May 16, 1991 affidavit, paragraph 12. 
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The Court can find no reference in the Lin affidavits or 
the Lin deposition to the preference for a 48 inch auger over a 
12 inch auger or to the use of fire hoses to clean debris. 
Furthermore, while the December 10 affidavit suggests it is not 
good engineering practice to utilize blasting for debris 
removal, there is no evidence of how blasting caused 
plaintiffs' damage. Consequently, defendants' alleged 
negligence due to the method of augering and use of fire hoses 
and a causative link between blasting and plaintiffs' damage 
have no evidentiary support. 
The sole remaining factual issue submitted by plaintiffs 
involves the allegation that the defendants were negligent in 
interrupting the flow by capping the inlet pipe. There is but 
one reference to this in the testimony of Lin. This occurs in 
paragraph 14 of the May 16 affidavit. There Lin suggests the 
consequence of the capping was that the pipe thereafter became 
plugged. Throughout his deposition, however, he steadfastly 
testified that the pipe became plugged before the flood. (Lin 
deposition, pp. 12, 13, 18, 22). Moreover, in the deposition 
he testified that his claim of negligence related to pre-flood 
conduct. (Lin deposition, pp. 31-32). The affidavit 
reference to the capping of the inlet pipe is at best oblique. 
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Furthermore, there is no factual basis for the premise that the 
pipe became plugged after the flood began and plaintiffs' 
expert denies the premise. 
The above analysis indicates that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact concerning each of the alleged theories of 
negligence. Additionally, the Court is further persuaded that 
plaintiffs have not demonstrated a duty owed to them sufficient 
to overcome the showing necessitated by Feree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). Such a showing is particularly necessary 
in a case such as this where the claimed injury is not the 
inundation of property but the loss of business revenues due to 
the difficulties of consumer ingress and egress. Defendants 
are therefore entitled to Summary Judgment. This determination 
renders moot the City's request for sanctions and plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Complaint. 
The City's motion for contempt is denied. The allegations 
of unprofessional and unethical conduct are not within the 
Court's contempt powers. If counsel believes there has been a 
breach of the governing rules of conduct, referral should be 
made to the Utah State Bar. 
Dated this r" day of September, 1991, 
IL 
IICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Salt Lake City Attorney 
BRUCE R. BAIRD #0176 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7788 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, 
INC., d/b/a HOPE OF AMERICA 
THRIFT STORE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF 
SALT LAKE CITY AND 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, AND 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. C83-6678 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The following identified motions came on regularly for 
hearing and oral argument before the Honorable Judge, Michael R. 
Murphy, on the 3rd day of June 1991 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock 
a.m.; to-wit: Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions, dated on or about May 9, 
1991; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 
15, 1991; and Salt Lake City's Motion for Contempt, dated May 3, 
1991. Also pending before the Court was the plaintiffs' motion 
to amend its complaint dated April 22, 1991, which motion was not 
noticed by the plaintiff for hearing, but was included in the 
City's Notice of Hearing and Notice of Oral Argument as an 
optional matter for Court consideration. The motion to amend was 
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not orally argued on June 3, 1991 or requested to be so argued by 
the plaintiff. 
Salt Lake City was present through the appearance of its 
counsel of record, Roger F. Cutler. Salt Lake County was present 
through representation of its attorney of record, Kevan F. Smith. 
The plaintiffs were represented by their attorneys of record: 
Wesley F. Sine and Marcus G. Theodore. 
The Court having heard the oral arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises took the matters under 
advisement. It independently reviewed the written memoranda 
submitted by the respective counsel and, independently, reviewed 
the matters of record as indicated in its memorandum decision. 
Having been fully advised in the premises, the Court entered its 
written Summary Decision and Order, dated September 4, 1991, and 
based thereon 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
and the same is hereby granted; all of plaintiffs' claims against 
said defendant are dismissed, with prejudice. 
2. Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
and the same is hereby granted; all of plaintiffs' claims, 
against Salt Lake County are dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Salt Lake City's Motions for Rule 37 Sanctions and 
Contempt are denied. 
4. The plaintiffs' Motion to Amend its Complaint is denied. 
5. The defendants, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, are 
2 
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awarded their costs, pursuant to law. 
this / ^ day of /Qcl^b*. 1991 DATED this jr day of A/f ZT^/^ 
BY THE COURT: 
fk2^ f{ 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Judge 
/ IA—pL~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed copies of the foregoing by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this jtS^day of T^s^^XT^X^,\ 
1991, to the following: 
Anne Swensen 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kevan F. Smith 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Paul J. Toscono 
Trustee Rancho Lanes 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kimball R. Mosier 
Trustee Sine Investments 
8 East 300 South, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Wesley F. Sine 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Marcus G. Theodore 
466 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
QVWv^  OWfr 
RFCicc 
015S9 
